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ABSTRACT 
Housing subsidies are used by developed welfare states to ensure their citizens can access 
decent and affordable housing. This paper assesses the relative importance of individual and 
area level factors on the degree to which private sector landlords were affected by changes 
to Local Housing Allowance (LHA) in the UK. The changes were part of the Government’s 
package of measures to reform LHA and reduce the welfare benefit bill. Multi-level modelling 
techniques have been applied to a longitudinal survey of 788 private sector landlords who 
had LHA tenants in 19 Local Authorities across GB. The analysis shows that whilst landlords 
were affected by reforms, area effects were not as pronounced as anticipated. In general 
landlords were equally affected regardless of where they operate. The findings suggest 
tenants in the most affected areas have absorbed increases in their rent shortfall signifying 
income was not the overriding determinant of demand. 
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Introduction 
 
Housing subsidies are used by developed welfare states across the world to ensure their 
citizens can access decent and affordable housing. Subsidies are characterised as being 
either supply or demand sided. Supply side policies (Oxley, 1987) include low interest loans, 
indirect subsidies and price regulation targeted at housing suppliers - such as builders, 
landlords and financiers – in order to provide housing at lower prices or rents. Conversely 
demand side interventions provide assistance to housing consumers (e.g. renters), most 
commonly though income related subsidies or housing allowances paid to consumers (or 
directly to landlords on behalf of consumers). 
Policy instruments employed to subsidise housing have varied between countries and 
over time (Dorling, 1997). Until the early 1970s developed countries tended to focus their 
efforts on supply side – ‘bricks and mortar’ - housing subsidies. This reflected the need to 
address then prevailing housing shortages arising from, in particular, the effects of two world 
wars (Howenstine, 1986). From the mid-1970s the focus shifted to income related housing 
allowance schemes and market or near market rents (Kemp, 1990; Harding, 2011). This 
reflected housing affordability becoming the most pressing issue (Grigsby and Bourassa, 
2004), at a time when many developed countries moved to more selective, as opposed to 
universal, approaches to welfare provision. While these broad patterns characterised many 
developed economies, considerable variations remained between countries in relation to 
housing allowances with regard to eligibility, degree of choice, incentive mechanisms, and 
extent of oversight (Steuerle and Twombly, 2002; Hulse, 2003; Priemus et al., 2005; Kemp, 
2007; Agiro and Matusitz, 2011).  
                                                                        
Many countries have sought to address five key issues in their housing allowances 
systems (Kemp, 2007, 276-279): the rising cost of housing allowance systems; the 
'uncontrollability' of demand-led housing allowance expenditure (see also Haffner and 
Boelhouwer, 2006 and Priemus et al., 2005); the prospect of means-tested systems creating 
work disincentives; the risks of over-consumption in housing by reducing recipients' incentive 
to shop around; and concern that allowances might result in rent inflation in the housing 
market. In response to these concerns a number of countries have sought to fine-tune their 
systems (Turner and Elsinga, 2005). For example Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden all 
introduced reductions in entitlement levels during the 1990s following shared concerns with 
regard to the rising cost of housing allowances (Kemp, 2007). In addition most systems have 
created some ineligible households, have utilised tapers, or have introduced differential rents 
implicitly based on income and rent (Haffner and Boelhouwer, 2006). The US voucher 
system, for instance, has been compared to other systems using notional rent such as those 
operating in Germany and in Britain.  
This paper makes important contributions to the underdeveloped international 
literature on housing allowance (welfare) reform and private landlords. The particular focus is 
on the relative importance of individual and area level factors impacting on the degree to 
which private sector landlords have been affected by, and reacted to, government policy 
designed to reduce housing subsidy expenditure. Recent policy changes to Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) in the British private rented sector (PRS) have been used here as a case 
study. From this focused example the paper provides evidence against two key questions 
which are of wider international relevance. First, the extent to which tenants are able to 
absorb different (absolute) reductions in housing allowance, or whether they lead to indirect 
impacts on landlords, such as defaulting on their housing costs, negotiating a lower rent or 
giving up a tenancy. A second contribution is to the limited literature on how private landlords 
manage their portfolio in response to housing allowance reforms. The paper considers the 
reaction of affected private landlords, exploring whether those in certain areas are more likely 
to leave the LHA market, for example because they are able to substitute into other rental 
markets, compared to those operating in other areas.      
The next three sections: provide a brief background to LHA and the reforms; consider 
the theoretical impact of the reforms, including outlining the hypothesis which the paper 
tested; and present the current evidence base on the impact of the reforms. The paper then 
moves on to describe the research methods used and the subsequent results. A discussion 
of the results and a conclusion then follow. 
 
                                                                        
LHA and the reforms 
 
Housing Benefit (HB) in the UK was introduced in the 1982 Social Security and Housing 
Benefit Act, and replaced a previous system of rent allowances. HB is paid to tenants on a 
low income (in both the social and private sectors) in order to help them pay their rent. It has 
been reformed several times, including a significant overhaul in 2008 when the then Labour 
Government changed the way HB was calculated and paid to tenants in the PRS through the 
introduction of the LHA. The LHA is a way of calculating the eligible rent for tenants claiming 
HB in the deregulated PRS. It ensures that tenants in similar circumstances, in the same 
area, receive the same amount of financial support for their housing costs. Different LHA 
rates are set according to property size (shared, one, two, three and four plus bedrooms) in 
different Broad Rental Market Areas (BRMAs) across Great Britain (see Beatty et al., 2014a). 
BRMAs are set according to local housing market characteristics rather than via 
administrative boundaries. 
Further reforms to LHA, and which are the focus for this paper, were initially 
announced by the then 2010-2015 Coalition Government in 2010 and involved the reduction 
or removal of various tiers of support. They formed an important part of the Government’s 
overall package of measures to reduce the deficit through cutting back on welfare 
expenditure for working age adults. Changes to LHA were introduced against a backcloth of 
growing concern about housing subsidies in Britain, a trend mirrored in other countries also 
seeking to address issues in their housing allowance systems, as is outlined above. The four 
central charges were: 1) the high taper provided strong work disincentives (Gibb, 1995); 2) 
the system covered 100 per cent of rent (albeit subject to restrictions) and therefore created 
a moral hazard, reducing any incentive for claimants to shop around (Kemp, 1998) thus 
encouraging overconsumption (Hills, 1991); 3) the system contained relatively high horizontal 
inefficiencies, in that it was not restricted to those most in need; 4) the costs of the system 
had risen dramatically and because entitlement was demand led there was a fear of 
uncontrollability (Haffner and Boelhouwer, 2006; Priemus et al., 2005). The cost of HB 
increased from £11 billion in 1999-2000 to £20 billion in 2009-10 (DWP, 2010). However the 
Building and Social Housing Foundation (cited in DWP, 2010) argued that portraying the 
system as 'out of control' was an overstatement, as HB expenditure had remained at about 
14 per cent of the overall benefits bill for around two decades. Part of the reason for the 
escalation in the cost of HB in the 2000s was the growth in the number of households in the 
PRS, which increased from 1.9 million to 3.6 million from 2000 to 2011, as the UK became 
increasingly reliant on this sector to provide homes to tenants on a low income. Over the 
                                                                        
same period, the number of households in the social rented sector decreased by about 
100,000 to 4.1 million (ONS, 2013).  
The package of reforms announced by the government in the June 2010 Budget and 
the Spending Review of October 2010 aimed to save £1,765 million by 2014/15 (7 per cent 
of total expenditure) (Wilson, 2013). While reducing HB expenditure was the central aim of 
these reforms, other objectives included: providing a fairer system by removing situations 
where individuals could potentially receive large HB payments in areas of high market rents; 
ensuring families on benefits could not choose to live in properties that were unaffordable to 
many people in work and thereby removing work disincentives created by the receipt of high 
rates of benefit; exerting a downward pressure on private sector rent levels by breaking the 
link to average PRS market rents; and restricting growth in LHA rates to CPI, or in later years 
a one per cent uprating (DWP, 2010; for uprating changes, see DWP, 2012; DWP, 2013). 
 
The impact of the LHA reforms: theory 
 
The hypothesised impact of the LHA reforms, or retrenchment in housing allowance 
provision, can be illustrated within a standard economic model of demand and supply. Figure 
1 shows a prevailing market in equilibrium at the intersection of D1 and S1. The introduction 
of the reforms reduces demand, shown by a shift to the left in the demand curve from D1 to 
D2. This reflects the reduced financial resource available to households which in turn will 
affect the level of demand for rented housing at a given price. The shift to the left in demand 
means the price that tenants are willing, or able, to pay for a rental property reduces from p1 
to p2. Consequently rent negotiations, vacancies or arrears emerge and the quantity of units 
supplied will reduce from q1 to q2. In the medium and long run the change to supply will be 
greater as supply becomes more elastic (variable). The supply curve will move S1 to S2, 
which in this model would lead to an increase in price. 
  
                                                                        
Figure 1. The impact of the LHA reform on demand and supply 
  
This basic model depicts a macro level assessment. Consideration of the spatial 
dimension behind the reforms is important in order to understand whether and how these 
have changed the 'welfare geography' of the United Kingdom (Smith, 1973). Unlike most 
other benefits, LHA expenditure is disproportionally concentrated in high demand areas such 
as London and the South East of England (Hamnett, 2009). This has led to political 
arguments about fairness, in that claimants could therefore afford to rent in areas where 
'working families' could not afford to buy (Prime Minister: David Cameron Bluewater, Kent, 
25/6/12). Early projections of savings from the LHA reforms suggested their impact would 
vary across different parts of the United Kingdom (Brewer et al., 2014). These showed that 
the largest impacts would be seen in areas where pre-reform rents were high, the absolute 
difference between the 50th and 30th percentile of local rents was large, the spread in rents 
was large (which meant the shift to Consumer Price Index (CPI) using uprating would be 
greatest) and the housing market exhibited certain characteristics, such as having larger 
proportions of young renters. As such the LHA reforms could increase the spatial 
unevenness of welfare provision and reduce horizontal equality across places in access to 
housing. 
The spatial variation, identified by Brewer et al. (2014), suggests there would be area 
effects in how landlords have been affected and reacted to the LHA reforms. The degree to 
which the demand curve shifted to the left within the economic model is likely to have varied 
between areas: depicted in Figure 2 by demand curves D2a, D2b and D2c. The areas where 
the welfare savings were largest, described above, are likely to have experienced the largest 
shifts, from D1 to D2c. In such areas, for a given supply curve the fall in price and quantity 
would have been greater. The elasticity of supply is also likely to have varied by area: supply 
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curves S1x, S1y and S1z in Figure 2. In those areas with high housing demand landlords 
would have had greater opportunity to substitute into other markets. Within the economic 
model the supply curve would be flatter - S1z in figure 2 - meaning for a given shift in the 
demand curve the fall in supply would be greater and the fall in price smaller.  
Figure 2. The impact of the LHA reform on demand and supply, with area effects 
 
A number of factors may mitigate against area effects, including the capacity of 
tenants to absorb any financial loss due to the reforms, as well as the composition of 
landlords within areas. Although there is relatively little evidence about private landlords and 
how they manage their properties there is some existing evidence which reveals the 
heterogeneous nature of landlordism in the UK. Quantitative data has highlighted the 
diversity of landlords in terms of both their socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds 
and their property portfolios (DCLG, 2010; Lord et al., 2013; Wallace and Rugg, 2014). The 
recent entrance of institutional investors, such as private equity firms and financial institutions 
in helping drive the growth in the PRS, particularly in London and the South East, has also 
been highlighted; however this has been overshadowed by the growing importance of 'small-
time' landlords since the 1990s (Ronald and Kadi, 2016). In 2010, private individuals or 
couples accounted for 89 per cent of private landlords, up from 61 per cent in the early 1990s, 
and 81 per cent of these landlords owned just one let (DCLG, 2011). Qualitative research 
has also explored the heterogeneity in landlords’ circumstances and motivations for 
engaging in landlordism. Soaita et al. (2016) found that while investing in the PRS was a way 
of diversifying large wealth portfolios by a very privileged few, it was also a prime asset-
building vehicle for financing retirement for some, a safety-net for others, while a few had to 
rely on rental income for basic subsistence. 
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While evidence on how private landlords manage their properties is relatively sparse, 
there have been some studies which have looked into the strategies private landlords employ 
and their awareness of relevant policy and legislation. Crook et al. (2016), for example, found 
that landlords in Scotland tend to restrict the acquisition of property close to where they 
themselves live to manage the market and business risks they face, relying on their own 
personal knowledge of markets in light of the complexities of the submarkets where they 
operate and the difficulties in obtaining relevant information. Work by the University of 
Cambridge (Monk et al., 2014) examining the business models of private landlords, indicated 
that awareness of responsibilities and standards in terms of legislation was low, particularly 
among small and medium landlords. This builds on earlier research which found that Scottish 
private landlords and some agents were poorly informed about both housing legislation and 
the state of the lettings market (Kemp and Rhodes, 1997). 
This paper tests the hypothesis that there were area effects: the impact of LHA 
reforms on landlords has been spatially uneven. That is the impact of the LHA reforms is 
consistent with Figure 2, as opposed to Figure 1 which shows no area effects. The findings 
from this research are important because the UK has become increasingly reliant on the 
PRS to house people on low incomes, and home ownership and market rents are beyond 
those on low incomes in many high demand areas of the country such as London. The paper 
will both shed some light on the response of landlords to the reforms and contribute to the 
evidence base on private landlords, as relatively little is known about the sector, or indeed 
about how landlords actually manage their properties (Crook et al., 2012). Findings from this 
work are of direct relevance to other countries seeking to reform their housing allowance 
systems, and seeking to establish any spatial differentiation such reforms might have on 
landlords and tenants.  
 
The impact of the LHA reforms: existing evidence 
 
The then Coalition Government's impact assessment showed that on average households 
would lose £12 per week because of the LHA reforms (DWP, 2010). It stated that the 
changes would 'place no direct burdens on landlords' but that indirectly they could 
experience greater numbers of tenants with arrears. This may mean that some landlords 
would choose not to continue renting to HB tenants if the rate of return was not attractive. In 
areas where landlords let predominantly to HB tenants or where overall demand was not 
high, landlords might be prepared to accept lower rents but may also as a consequence 
spend less on maintaining properties. Research by Fenton (2010) estimated that between 
                                                                        
136,000 and 269,000 households would find their rent payments unmanageable as a result 
of the LHA measures. Half of these households would be unable to sustain their tenancy and 
would therefore be evicted or need to move involuntarily. This led many landlords to 
reconsider or reduce their involvement in the LHA market (see for example Wellman, 2011; 
Wallace and Rugg, 2014; Beatty et al., 2014b and 2014c).  
Since that 2010 assessment limited evidence has emerged of landlords and tenants 
negotiating reduced rents as the Government intended (Fenton, 2010; Chowdhury and Cass, 
2014). Where negotiations have occurred evidence suggests landlords have reduced 
maintenance budgets, but value the continuity of retaining tenants, even if this means loss of 
some rental income. In addition profit margins have been placed under pressure (Beatty et 
al., 2014b; Lloyd, 2013). In high demand areas, such as London, when faced with shortfalls 
in their rent, tenants have proved less able to renegotiate with landlords or move to more 
affordable accommodation in their local area as the policy intended (Beatty et al., 2013 and 
McCarvill et al., 2012). In these areas landlords have a greater choice about letting to non-
LHA tenants compared with areas where LHA was dominant.  
The next section provides an overview of the methodology and analytical methods 
adopted. 
 
Methodology and methods 
 
A longitudinal survey of PRS landlords collated as part of a DWP funded evaluation of the 
LHA reforms in Great Britain forms the evidence for this paper. The evaluation adopted a 
mixed methods 'pragmatic' approach based on combining 'qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and data analysis within a single study' (Molina-Azorin, 2012). Such an approach 
ought to increase confidence in results because of the comprehensive nature of the evidence 
base, which in turn should allow greater understanding of underlying processes (Johnson 
and Christensen, 2004). 
The evaluation explored the consequences for both claimants and landlords in 19 diverse 
case study (local authority) areas spread throughout Great Britain (Figure 3). The research 
also involved spatial and econometric analysis of the effects of the measures at the national 
level. The 19 case study areas were not chosen to provide a nationally representative 
sample, but to ensure that a wide range of local housing market and labour market 
                                                                        
circumstances were included. The case study areas1 were selected to ensure that adequate 
sample sizes for sub-groups - of areas and respondents - could be secured. Four London 
Boroughs, three Welsh and three Scottish local authorities were included, as well as nine 
other local authorities across the English regions. Other factors considered in area selection 
included: housing demand; different labour market contexts, including more buoyant markets 
in the South East and weaker markets in older industrial Britain; urban and rural areas; areas 
with a potentially alternative supply of PRS tenants (such as students); the size of the Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BME) population in the local authority area; and seaside towns with 
concentrations of PRS housing.  
Figure 3. Map of case study areas 
                                            
1
 Barking and Dagenham, Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford, Brent, Cardiff, Denbighshire, Edinburgh, 
Exeter, Fenland, Hackney, Newcastle upon Tyne, North Lanarkshire, Perth and Kinross, Portsmouth, 
Rhondda Cynon Taff, Tendring, Thanet, Walsall, Westminster. 
                                                                        
  
Twenty nine separate BRMAs covered the 19 local authority case study areas. This 
means in some case study areas claimants could have moved within the local authority and 
faced different LHA rates. The maximum LHA caps by bedroom size only affected rent levels 
in three of the four London case study areas (Barking and Dagenham had LHA rates below 
maximum caps). By February 2012, all rates in the other three London areas were subject to 
the maximum caps, except for the one-bedroom rate only for the Inner East London part of 
Hackney and the one-bedroom rate only for the Inner West London part of Brent.  
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The first wave of the longitudinal survey of PRS landlords was carried out between 
September and October 2011. The sampling frame for the survey was derived from a 
number of sources, including landlord and HMO (Houses in Multiple Occupation) contact lists 
provided by the case study local authorities, landlord contacts from the National Landlords 
Association and British Property Federation, and names and addresses of landlords held via 
claimant records within the DWP's Single Housing Benefit Extract (SHBE). The potential 
sampling frame within each area varied in terms of overall numbers available and balance 
between these sources. This was due to varied practices across local authorities in terms of 
the extent and purpose for which landlord contact information was collected, local 
interpretation of Data Protection protocols, and varying data management systems for 
submission of HB records to the central SHBE system. 
In the first wave of the survey just under 17,000 questionnaires were sent out across 
the 19 areas, resulting in 1,867 completed questionnaires being returned. The overall 
response rate of 11 per cent reflected the impact of a number of factors such as the inclusion 
of non-LHA landlords in the sample who might have been less inclined to complete the 
questionnaire, the quality and maintenance of the source sample information available in 
some local areas, and lower response rates in London. The second wave was carried out 
between September and December 2012. All landlords who had returned a completed 
questionnaire in the first wave were asked to take part in the survey again. In total 967 
landlords responded, including 788 landlords who had had LHA tenants at both or either 
survey points. 
The aim of the survey was to gauge attitudes and perceptions of landlords in relation 
to changes being made to the LHA system and whether these attitudes had changed over 
the year. Landlords were asked whether the changes had affected them so far, whether they 
had altered their letting strategy specifically because of these changes, and their future 
intentions with regard to their lettings portfolio.  
The new rules were in force for new tenants for a period of 17 months by the time the 
follow-up survey was distributed. Nearly all HB claimants under the LHA system would by 
then have been subject to the new rules. This contrasted with the first wave of the survey, 
when the nine-month transitional period was still in force for many existing tenants.  
Reflecting on this evidence base, there are three key considerations that need to be 
borne to mind which have implications for both the methodology and interpretation of the 
findings. First, despite not knowing the size of the local authority LHA landlord populations it 
is fair to state that a relatively low response has been achieved. Nevertheless it represented 
a large overall sample compared to much research in this area. Second, there are potential 
                                                                        
biases within the local authority samples due to the low response and the heterogeneous 
nature of landlordism - as outlined earlier. The study was unable to determine the 
characteristics of the LHA landlord populations within case study local authority areas which 
means we were unable to assess the effect of any sample bias: whether estimates under- or 
over-state the existence of area affects. For example, if landlords with higher rent properties, 
larger properties (five or more bedrooms), younger tenants and single person households 
were under-represented in samples - especially in the areas Brewer et al. (2014) suggested 
would see the largest changes as a result of the LHA reforms - there will be a bias to under-
estimate the existence of area affects. Furthermore, because we do not know the 
characteristics of the true population we were unable to adopt sample weights to make the 
analysis more representative. Third, housing markets typically operate at sub-local authority 
levels. However there are logistical reasons why local authority case studies have been 
chosen as an appropriate lens to assess areas effects. Key to these: sub-local authority 
markets are socially determined, non-defined geographies (Crook et al., 2012); the data used 
for the sampling framework was unable to identify the precise location of landlord properties 
within a local authority; and there are unlikely to be sufficient LHA landlords operating within 
local authority sub-markets to provide a robust evidence base for quantitative analysis.  
Multi-level modelling (MLM) was the main analytical method used. MLM is used to 
test and analyse data with a hierarchical structure. The technique acknowledges that 
individual-level factors do not act in isolation from factors at other levels, such as the area in 
which the respondent operates: landlord responses within the same area may be related 
(Goldstein, 1995). The data were explored using random intercept mixed effect logit models 
at two levels. Level one was the landlord and level two composed the case study areas in 
which the landlord operated. For the purposes of the analysis the four London boroughs 
were combined into two areas - Inner (Westminster and Hackney) and Outer (Barking and 
Dagenham and Brent) London - resulting in 17 level two areas. As a by-product MLM models 
partition unexplained variation into what is due to factors at each of the levels within the 
model, which is determined by calculating the intra-class correlation (ICC). This method 
therefore indicates how much variation in the outcome variable was explained by the 
characteristics of the landlords themselves, and how much by the local authority area within 
which they operated (Goldstein et al., 2002).  
The ICC (ρ̂) is computed using the following formula: 
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where σ̂u
2 is the estimated variance between subjects and σ̂ε
2 is the estimated residual 
variance. 
                                                                        
Outcome variable 
An indicator of whether a landlord had been affected by the LHA reforms was the main 
outcome variable used in the analysis. This was derived from the following survey question:  
'Thinking of your lettings located within [AREA NAME], have any of the Housing 
Benefit/Local Housing Allowance reforms introduced in April 2011 affected you so far?'  
The response options were: 'Yes, a lot'; 'Yes, a fair amount'; 'Not very much'; 'Not at 
all'; and 'Don't know/not sure'. In the analysis this was turned into a binary variable with the 
first two categories used to identify landlords that had been affected by the reforms.  
Whilst this question does not explicitly ask whether landlords had been positively or 
negatively affected by the reforms to LHA, a follow-up question in the survey found those that 
had been affected had reported an increase in a wide range of negative factors - such as 
rent arrears, tenants negotiating a lower rent and tenants giving up their tenancy - which they 
attributed to these changes. A second potential issue with this outcome variable is it relies on 
attitudes and perceptions rather than observing more reliable statistical indicators (Wikman, 
2006). Attitudinal responses can suffer from the attitudinal fallacy (Jerolmack and Khan, 
2014) and fundamental attributional error (Ross and Nisbett, 1991) whereby respondents 
overstate the role of LHA in any changes to their lettings. Alternatively landlords may 
undervalue the role of LHA reforms because they have imperfect knowledge about the 
reforms and how they may have impacted on their lettings. Evidence from wave one of the 
survey (conducted between September and December 2012) suggested only 69 per cent of 
LHA landlords were aware of at least one element of the reforms. However the impact of the 
attitudinal fallacy on the interpretation of our results is reduced because the focus of the 
research is comparison between landlords in different areas where the survey method is 
assumed to be more reliable (Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). 
 
 
Results and Analysis  
 
This section explores the hypothesis outlined above. Before assessing the MLM, a 
descriptive assessment of responses to the main outcome variable has been provided. 
Descriptive assessment 
Across the whole sample, 41 per cent of respondents reported that their lettings in the 
relevant case study area had been affected by the reforms (Table 1). This is a finding in its 
                                                                        
own right. It suggests that the LHA changes, which were targeted at tenants, had filtered 
through to indirectly impact on the lettings of over two fifths of LHA landlords. The 
percentage affected 'a lot' or 'a fair amount' ranged from 50 per cent or more in Tendring (52 
per cent) Walsall (51 per cent) and inner London (Hammersmith and Fulham and Hackney; 
50 per cent) to less than a quarter of landlords in Denbighshire (22 per cent) and Fenland (21 
per cent).  
  
                                                                        
Table 1. Percentage of landlords: letting affected by LHA reforms 
    
  Per cent 
    
Tendring 52 
Walsall 51 
Inner London 50 
Outer London 47 
Edinburgh 46 
Blackburn with Darwen 45 
Bradford 45 
Portsmouth 45 
Rhondda Cynon Taff 45 
Newcastle upon Tyne 42 
North Lanarkshire 41 
Cardiff 35 
Perth and Kinross 34 
Thanet 31 
Exeter 29 
Denbighshire 22 
Fenland 21 
    
Total 41 
    
Source: CRESR LHA Landlord Survey (2011-12) 
  
                                                                        
A z-test for proportions was used to test for differences between each of the case 
study areas in the percentage of landlords who reported being affected. Statistical testing is 
important because it is only in instances where the difference is statistically significant that 
there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the observed difference has not occurred due to 
chance. A number of statistically significant differences were identified. The percentage of 
landlords affected by the reforms in Denbighshire and Fenland were both statistically lower 
(at a 0.05 level) than in each of the nine areas with the highest rates. Also the percentage of 
landlords affected in Thanet was statistically significantly lower (at a 0.05 level) than the rate 
in Tendring, Walsall and outer London (Barking and Dagenham and Brent).  
MLM 
Table 2 shows the results from the null mixed effects logit model with two levels. The ICC of 
the outcome variable was 0.014, indicating that only 1.4 per cent of the total variation in the 
likelihood that a landlord had been affected by the LHA changes was due to area level 
factors. Individual landlord level factors were therefore much more important, accounting for 
98.6 per cent of total variation in the outcome. 
Table 2. MLM Landlords' lettings affected by LHA reforms: null model parameters 
   
Parameter Coef. Confidence 
Interval 
 
  
  
Fixed Part   
Constant -0.372 (-0.552, -0.192) 
Random Part   
𝜎𝑢
2 0.451 (0.005, 0.376) 
 
0.134  
Log likelihood -516.6  
Source: CRESR LHA Landlord Survey (2011-12) 
  
                                                                        
Analysis of the model suggests that the data did not have a hierarchical structure. A 
likelihood ratio test was used to compare the MLM against a single level logistic regression 
model. However there was insufficient statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that 
there was no statistical difference between the two models at a 0.05 level. Further evidence 
was provided by computing the design effect. This adjusts the ICC to take into account the 
average area level sample size. The design effect provides justification for the application of 
MLM by quantifying the effect of independence violation on standard evidence (Peugh, 2010). 
In this instance the design effects was 1.6 (1+(average group size-1)*ICC = 1.6) which was 
less than the level deemed necessary for MLM to account for area effects. 
Figure 4 provides a 'Caterpillar' plot of the area level residuals to illustrate the degree 
of variation amongst the case study areas. From this it is possible to identify the extent to 
which an area was different to the average and other areas. The plot shows that there was 
insufficient statistical evidence to suggest any of the 17 areas were different to the sample 
average. However there was some evidence of difference between areas, after accounting 
for individual 'landlord' variation. On average landlords in Tendring were statistically more 
likely (at a 0.05 level) to have been affected by the LHA reforms compared to landlords in 
either Denbighshire or Thanet. Landlords in Walsall were also statistically more likely to have 
been affected compared to landlords in Denbighshire, at a 0.05 level. 
Figure 4. Caterpillar plot of area level residuals 
 
Source: CRESR LHA Landlord Survey (2011-12) 
  
                                                                        
In summary the analysis shows that there was very limited evidence for any area 
effect in how the LHA reforms had affected landlords.  
 
Discussion 
 
The findings from the empirical evidence presented above raise three issues for discussion 
and further analysis:  
 Why were area effects not identified? 
 What individual level factors were associated with the likelihood of being affected 
by the changes?  
 Were any specific area level factors associated with the likelihood of being 
affected by the changes? 
Why were area effects not identified? 
There are perhaps four plausible reasons why area level effects were not identified. First, the 
area effect may have been borne elsewhere or blunted by other factors. Evidence from a 
separate DWP funded evaluation on the impact of the LHA changes found that 89 per cent of 
the initial incidence of reduced LHA entitlements fell on tenants and six per cent on landlords 
(Brewer et al., 2014). This may mean the reforms have a lagged area effect on landlords as 
tenants struggle to pay their rents at a later date, the effects of which would not be picked up 
in this study. Similarly the impacts of the LHA reforms on tenants, and in turn landlords, were 
likely to have been blunted by DHPs (Discretionary Housing Payments). However DHPs 
were not viewed as a permanent solution, with funding due to be reduced from 2015/16 
(Wilson, 2015). Therefore the impact of the changes would need to be monitored over a 
longer time period in order to establish if any further area specific impacts emerged. 
Second, some of the reforms were more likely to have induced area level effects than 
others - such as the increase to the age limit which the SAR is applicable - which affect 
specific types of landlords regardless of where they were located. The landlord survey 
allowed this hypothesis to be tested. As a follow up to the main outcome question, landlords 
who had been affected were asked to identify which of the various measures had affected 
them. Analysis of these questions using MLM identified statistical evidence of an area effect 
in relation to the abolition of the five bedroom rate. Eighteen per cent of the total variation in 
the response to this measure was accounted for by variation at the area level. Assessing the 
design effect and likelihood ratio test against a logistic regression model confirmed evidence 
                                                                        
of a hierarchical structure to this data. Of the 17 areas, the expected likelihood of being 
affected by the abolition of the five bedroom LHA rate was statistically higher than the 
average in Outer London and Newcastle. There was also weak evidence of area level 
variation with respect to landlords being affected due to the capping of the maximum weekly 
LHA rate by property size.  
Third, landlord area effects may only emerge when assessing specific ways in which 
landlords may have been affected, rather than responses to generalised questions. The 
survey contained six detailed questions which allowed this hypothesis to be tested, including 
increased rent arrears and evictions; increases in tenants trying to re-negotiate rents; or 
ceased lettings to LHA tenants. Using the same MLM approach one such question had a 
design effect of 2, indicating evidence of a hierarchical structure to the data. An area effect 
was found in landlords who identified tenants currently in arrears because they could no 
longer afford rent due to the LHA reforms. However, this effect was small: 2.2 per cent of the 
total variation in landlord responses was at the area level. 
Finally, a technical reason relating to how MLMs identify and quantify area effects 
may explain why none were identified. MLMs look for evidence across all areas. However in 
reality there may only have been a small number of 'outliers' in which landlords were 
statistically more or less likely to have been affected by the reforms. If this is the case, the 
LHA reforms may have had a meaningful area effect, justifying initial fears, but these were 
not area effects as assessed by statistical testing for a hierarchal structure in responses. 
Analysis from the survey appears to support this. Ordinary logistic regression modelling (at a 
single level) identified that landlords in Denbighshire, Fenland and Thanet were statistically 
less likely to have had their lettings affected by the reforms. Both Fenland and Thanet are 
characterised by dominant LHA submarkets while Denbighshire is a rural area with a 'small 
landlord' PRS mentality. 
What individual level factors were associated with the likelihood of being affected by the 
changes?  
This question is important given the dominance of individual landlord level factors in 
explaining the variation in the likelihood of a landlord's lettings being affected by the reforms. 
The landlord survey asked a number of questions about the characteristics landlords and 
their lettings to be explored. These are described in Table 3 and include:  
 general questions, such as whether they were a full, or part, -time landlord, the 
length of time they had been a landlord and whether they were a 'buy to let' 
landlord 
                                                                        
 questions about the size and make-up of their portfolio, such as how many 
properties they let in the area, whether they operated across multiple areas and 
whether they let shared accommodation  
 information about their tenant base such as whether they let to tenants on out of 
work benefits or to single people under 35 years. 
Table 3. Summary of landlord level explanatory variables 
        
Variable Code Number Per cent 
        
LHA concentration 
100% 234 30 
75% less than 100% 90 12 
50% less than 75% 130 17 
25% less than 50% 91 12 
more than 0% less than 25% 59 8 
0% 168 22 
Number of lettings 
1 199 26 
2 - 5 275 36 
6 - 10 121 16 
11 - 50 130 17 
Over 50 47 6 
Length of time 
Less than 5 years 100 13 
5 years but less than 10 years 200 26 
For 10 years or more 472 61 
Managing agent 
No 695 90 
Yes 77 10 
Full-time landlord 
No 529 69 
Yes 243 31 
Let to single people 
aged 34 or under 
No 324 42 
Yes 448 58 
Buy-to-let landlord? 
No 248 32 
Yes 524 68 
Let any shared 
accommodation? 
No 534 69 
Yes 238 31 
Let to Students 
No 624 81 
Yes 148 19 
Multi area landlord 
Single area 435 56 
Multi area 337 44 
Source: CRESR LHA Landlord Survey (2011-12) 
  
                                                                        
Logistic regression modelling was used to test which of these explanatory variables 
were statistically associated to the outcome variable: lettings in the area have been affected 
by the LHA reforms. In these models area level dummies were included to account for any 
area level variation. 
Four statistically significant relationships emerged. The strongest associations were 
identified with LHA concentration in the area and the size of the landlord's portfolio. Generally 
speaking the lower a landlord's concentration of lettings in the LHA sector the less likely they 
were to have been affected by the reforms. Conversely the more lettings a landlord had in 
the area the more likely it was that their lettings had been affected.  
Further statistically significant relationships were identified with whether the 
respondent identified themselves as a full-time (as opposed to a part-time) landlord or Buy-
to-Let (as opposed to a non-Buy-to-Let) landlord. Both of these characteristics were on 
average found to increase the likelihood that a landlord had been affected by the LHA 
reforms. These raise potential concerns as both groups are likely to be dependent on their 
lettings to provide income and to meet their mortgage repayments.  
There was only sufficient evidence to conclude one area was statistically different to 
the group average. Landlords in Denbighshire were on average statistically less likely to 
have been affected by the changes, holding all other factors constant.   
Were any specific area level factors associated with the likelihood of being affected by the 
changes? 
Despite the analysis failing to identify meaningful area effects, it is worth considering whether 
there is any statistical evidence of specific area level factors being associated with the 
likelihood that the LHA reforms had affected a landlord's lettings in a given area. Five area 
level variables were considered: the average reduction in LHA rates paid to claimants, the 
size of the LHA submarket, the type of area, the number of LHA claimants and the number of 
LHA claimants aged 25 to 34 years. Exploratory analysis, entering these variables 
individually into MLMs as level two factors identified one statistically significant relationship 
with the outcome variable. Landlords in areas where the average reduction in LHA rates was 
more than £10 were more likely on average to have had their lettings affected by the LHA 
reforms; this relationship was statistically significant at a 0.05 level. However it should be 
noted there was insufficient statistical evidence for this variable in a model which also 
included the four individual, level one, factors identified in the previous sub-section.    
 
 
                                                                        
Conclusion 
 
From the mid 1970's developed welfare states have sought to ensure access to decent and 
affordable housing by shifting away from supply side subsidies to demand side interventions, 
namely income related housing allowances schemes and market or near market rents. A 
series of concerns emerged about housing allowance systems primarily around their 
increasing cost, possible work disincentives, and over-consumption of housing. In Britain the 
2010-15 Coalition Government announced important reforms to LHA in 2010 as part of its 
overall package of measures to reduce the deficit through cutting back on welfare 
expenditure for working age adults. The LHA reforms, which included the reduction or 
removal of various tiers of support, aimed to provide 'fairness' (Hamnett, 2014) between 
claimants and non-claimants in terms of their access to housing markets. 
This paper has focussed on the consequences of the reforms for landlords and tested 
the hypothesis that there were area effects in the impact of the LHA reforms on landlords: 
that the impact of reforms has proved to be spatially uneven. The responses of landlords are 
important because they affect the level of supply. Underlying the assessment of area effects 
is a questioning of the justification and impact of implementing changes that increase the 
spatial unevenness of welfare provision. Unlike most other benefits, LHA is disproportionally 
concentrated in London and the South East (Hamnett, 2009). Spatial patterns in welfare 
geography are often the outcome of secondary factors - such as industrial decline or housing 
affordability - and the resultant clustering of welfare claimants within particular areas (Walker 
and Huby, 1989). Spatial benefit transfers act to lessen regional economic disparities. Powell 
and Boyne (2001) argue that much academic debate has been simplistic in that it has not 
taken account of context and has assumed a viewpoint that geographic inequalities in 
welfare expenditure are undesirable. Instead they argue that such inequalities may be 
necessary and desirable in order to rectify inequalities of condition. This argument is 
applicable to the case of LHA expenditure in the United Kingdom. A spatial inequality in LHA 
expenditure has been required to enable 'horizontal equality' in access to housing across 
claimants, making geography irrelevant (Newton, 1980; MacKay, 2001; Powell and Boyne, 
2001).  
This analysis has shown that landlords have been indirectly affected by the LHA 
reforms which were only directly targeted at tenants. However, area effects in the extent to 
which landlords were affected have not been as pronounced as anticipated. In general 
landlords of similar types have been equally affected regardless of where they operate. Area 
level differences in the extent to which landlords were affected are likely to be due to the 
                                                                        
makeup of landlords operating in the area rather than differences in the degree of LHA 
changes facing tenants. This implies that the impacts of the reforms were characterised by 
the economic model in Figure 5 (not Figure 2 as had been hypothesised): the shift D1 to D2 
and the angle of S1 were similar in all areas, indicating a similar impact on price and quantity 
demanded. It should be noted that some statistically significant areas effects were identified 
when considering particular elements of reforms and particular effects. However, the 
overriding finding was not what had been expected by many commentators, for example that 
landlords would exit the LHA market on a grand scale within particular areas of the country.  
Figure 5. The impact of the LHA reform on demand and supply, no area effects 
 
Given the spatial inequalities within the LHA reforms (Brewer et al., 2014) this implies 
the income elasticity of demand is relatively small, at least in the short run. This has wider 
international relevance as to how tenants react to reductions in housing allowance (or similar 
income shocks). Tenants in the most affected areas have absorbed increases in their rent 
shortfall suggesting income was not the overriding determinant of demand. It may instead 
reflect the value tenants place on remaining in situ in high demand areas, combined with the 
costs of moving away from support networks and employment opportunities. Though not 
considered in this study, further research is needed to consider how LHA tenants were able 
to meet their shortfall, particularly whether it has been met by going without necessities or 
increasing occupancy rates.Despite no overall significant area effects emerging in this 
analysis, it is still important to bear in mind lagged effects, which are likely to be compounded 
by the array of other reductions in working age benefits, the drip-drip effect of annual LHA 
rate rises below the rate of inflation, and the reduction in DHP budgets. It is important that 
governments are aware of the spatial implications of their policies and understand that 
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fairness can look very different in different spatial economies. This may mean a more formal 
assessment of the degree to which any policy creates uneven spatial impact (Mohan, 2003), 
combined with a more thorough understanding of the context to, and circumstances 
underlying, spatial variations (Mohan, 2003; Milbourne, 2010). Prioritising vertical over 
horizontal equality in the provision of welfare will instead tend to reinforce segregation and 
growing imbalances between places over time. The composition of the LHA landlord 
population could change quickly. Landlords rent their properties to provide a return (Kemp 
and Rhodes, 1997). If the return falls, either due to increased arrears or reduced rents being 
paid, landlords will look to reduce their participation (supply) in the LHA market. The elasticity 
of supply is likely to be greatest in the most affected areas: areas where the LHA changes 
have provided the largest rent shortfalls for tenants tend to coincide with high demand areas 
where landlords will have greatest freedom to substitute into other markets, or sell up and 
exit the sector altogether. As a further consequence the shift in the market equilibrium 
position, in particular the fall in price, could lead to poorer quality accommodation being let as 
landlords reduce maintenance budgets and have less need to compete against other lettings 
on quality.  
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